Responding to Ásta's Conferalist Framework

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In philosopher Ásta's 2018 book Categories we Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race and Other Social Categories, she lays out an interesting framework for assessment of the idea of social construction (the degree to which something is the product of social forces) and how we can assess whether or not something, such as membership in a particular social group, is socially constructed. Ásta accomplishes this by laying out what she calls the “Conferalist Framework,” which proposes two models by which we can understand social group membership. First, she establishes the idea of “constitution,” explaining that if something is to be considered “constituted,” such as membership in a social group, that something is what it is, regardless of whether or not someone else deems it so (Ásta 10). Essentially, "constitution" finds that membership in a particular group is something intrinsic to a person, and is independent of the perceptions of others. Ásta contrasts this idea of “constitution” with the idea of “conference,” arguing that if something is to be considered “conferred,” that means that such a property, quality, or membership in a social group is not a matter of fact, but is instead judged, deemed, and “conferred” by others onto someone based on physical and external characteristics and properties (9). She uses several examples to illustrate the difference between conference and constitution, including the example of social popularity. She argues that “We cannot be popular in isolation,” so “our popularity is entirely dependent on other people’s harboring certain feelings toward us,” such that “ other people’s harboring certain feelings toward us confers the property of being popular on us” (8). Through this example of social popularity, Ásta demonstrates the process by which social group membership is conferred onto us from others, rather than it being part of our intrinsic constitution. Ásta then goes on to apply this same framework and reasoning to other social groups that exist in our society, such as those of gender, race, sexuality, and religion. She argues that our placement in such categories is often “against our will,” and as a result we are “constrained and enabled by our placement in these categories” (18). Moreover, she argues that conferral can be rooted in authority, as it is when institutions confer categories onto us, and that conferral can also be rooted in the social standing of someone else, as it is in the case of communal conference (which she defines as the categories conferred onto us by those not in positions of authority, but in positions of higher relative social standing) (18, 19). Ásta then reiterates her points by explaining that under the conferalist framework, it is not membership in a group that matters, but rather the perception and judgement of others that one is a member of a group (24). On the other hand, under the constitutionalist framework, it is the “presence of the feature that matters, irrespective of the perception” (25). Moreover, under the conferalist model, there is an account for the “story for the acquisition of the property,” or in other words attention paid to the ways in which a property of a person or social group is gained. 

In response to Ásta’s arguments, I have similar reservations as those that I had to Judith Butler’s arguments about social construction, particularly in reference to the social group of gender. I do think that Ásta’s framework and distinctions between “conferral” and “constitution” are very clearly laid out, but I do not necessarily agree that all social categories can be considered instances of conferral. Though I did not read the entirety of her book and so therefore there is a possibility that she addresses these objections later on, I think it is a bit of an assumption to say that every single social category must be conferred onto the members of that category, and that there is no intrinsic, constitutionalist basis for such categories. I point this out because I do not see how conferral can be reconciled with the very innate, intrinsic, and fundamental ways in which individuals, particularly transgender individuals, experience their own gender identities. Put another way, if all social categories, including gender, are externally conferred upon us based on the perception and judgement of others that we are members of a group, then that seems to violate some of our notions of personal identity. I do concede that at first, without clarification, others might perceive us to be members of a particular group based on their stereotypes and conceptions of what a member of a particular group might look like, but how someone is perceived does not impact who they truly know themselves to be. How others perceive us is important to the ways in which we navigate the world, but at the same time, such perceptions do not change our deeply held, non-superficial realities. I think that Ásta’s model is invalidating, for instance, for anyone that might not externally appear (in the traditionally, stereotypically understood sense) to be a member of a group that they are in fact a part of. I think the key here might instead be to either politely ask a person if we are unsure about their membership in a group, try our hardest not to make assumptions about a person's group membership, or to at very least check our biases and assumptions following our initial judgements.