Can Judith Butler’s “Performance Acts and Gender Constitution” be Interpreted in a Trans-Positive Light?

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Upon reading philosopher Judith Butler’s “Performance Acts and Gender Constitution” it is easy to see how transfeminists might take issue with many of her claims. This is because, in Butler’s view, gender is something that is socially constructed and performed, rather than something that is innate to a person. As Butler puts it, “the body is a set of possibilities” that is “not predetermined by some manner of interior essence” (Butler 521). By interior essence, Butler is making reference to the foundational transfeminist idea of innate gender identity. Essentially, Butler makes the case that gender is something one does through his/her/their acts (namely “bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds”)  rather than something one is (519). In her eyes, “gender is not a fact,” but rather an idea, and the “various acts of gender creates the idea of gender” such that “without those acts, there would be no gender at all” (522). 

I think what makes Butler’s work so particularly difficult to reconcile with transfeminist ideas is the hard fought transfeminist notion that trans people are in fact the gender they identify with for no reason other than the fact that they are. One does not have to look further than the popular rallying cries heard widely in trans activist circles that “Trans Men Are Men!” and “Trans Women Are Women!” to see that for such activists, this recognition is crucial to trans acceptance and dignity. This distinction reminds trans and cis people alike that trans people are valid simply by reason of being trans. Being trans, they assert, is not contingent on outward appearance, behaviors, or the presence or absence of medical transition. The only requirement to be trans, they attest, is to be trans. Therefore, I think these hallmarks of transfeminism and trans activism come into direct opposition with Butler’s notions of gender because for Butler, gender is not an identity, but rather the performance acts featuring gendered historical or cultural significance. This means that if one is not actively “performing” gender in specific ways, then his/her/their gender essentially does not exist. 

Under Butler’s conception of gender, one could argue that there is little difference between doing drag (heightened or exaggerated performance of gender) and being trans (which transfeminists and activists see as an identity that is deeper, more innate, and goes beyond external performances). It is easy to see how many trans folks might therefore take take issue with something as fundamental to them as who they are as being reduced to what can be likened to theatrical performance. Trans people argue that, unlike cis drag performers, they cannot remove their identity in the way that one removes performative costume or makeup at the end of the day. For trans folks, clothes are not mere costume, and identity goes far beyond the external. 

I also think that much of Butler’s wording lies in deep opposition with transfeminist ideology. As someone who frequently argues in favor of transfeminist ideas, I was immediately taken aback by her phrasing. She refers to gender as “fiction,” and argues that gender is “real only to the extent that it is performed” (Butler 522, 527). I think these statements struck and stood out to me because they mirror some of the painful transphobic utterances that often directed toward trans people. Trans activists have fought so long and so hard for recognition that the identities of trans folks are indeed real, and so it is logical that Butler’s arguments to the contrary might raise red flags from the perspectives of transfeminists. 

Overall, I find it very difficult, and if not impossible to reconcile Butler’s ideas of gender performativity with the ideas of transfeminism. She rests her argument on the idea that an internal, pre-existing gender identity (“essence”) does not in fact exist, which is directly opposed to the work that transfeminists and activists fight for. I will say, though, that some of her goals do seem both noble and in-line with support of trans folks. For instance, she argues that “there is nothing about a binary gender system that is given,” an idea that many trans activists and feminists push for (531). Moreover, I found her reference to the body as a “set of possibilities” to be a fairly liberating frame of reference for both trans and cis people, since if separated from Butler’s use of the phrase, this idea can be repurposed and used as an invitation for everyone to play with their gender expression if they so choose (521). I think the key difference from Butler here is that for Butler, an underlying gender identity does not exist at all, whereas expression and performance do in fact exist and therefore constitute gender.  

To conclude, while I do not think her ideas can be reconciled with transfeminism, I believe that Butler wants for goals similar to transfeminists: to create a world in which people are free to express themselves as they so choose. Where she irreconcilably diverges from transfeminists, in my view, is in her lack of recognition of who people are beneath that outward expression.